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3 February 1988

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: DCI Testimony on the INF Treaty for the  
Senate Intelligence Committee, 3 February 1988

On 3 February 1988, the DCI provided testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee concerning the intelligence considerations in the INF Treaty.

A copy of the DCI testimony is enclosed, and is the same text used for testimony for Senate Foreign Relations on 17 February. The same briefing book, questions/answers, and background papers were used for the DCI's appearance before the SSCI on 3 February and the SFRC on 17 February. [redacted]

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[redacted] of DIA was another witness for the Intelligence Community and his statement is also enclosed. Other intelligence representatives who attended and answered questions posed by the Committee included the following:

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[redacted] NSA, Larry Gershwin, NIO/SP; [redacted] Director, ACIS, Bob Walpole of State INR; Doug McEachin of DI/SOVA, [redacted] ICS. [redacted]

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Members of the SSCI who attended the hearing were Senators Boren, Cohen, Bradley, Nunn, Cranston, [redacted]

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Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee who were present included Senators Quayle, Glenn, Wilson, Exon, and Humphrey. [redacted]

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The hearing was held at the TS/Codeword/Byeman level, from 1410 to 1630 hours, and a transcript was prepared by Fred Ward. [redacted]

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The record for the 3 February hearing includes two sets of QFR's based on issues raised in the hearing and staff queries submitted subsequent to 3 February. NIO/SP coordinated the Intelligence Community response to the QFR's. [redacted]

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Senator Wilson provided his views that the Soviet will cheat and that the U.S. acknowledges some uncertainty about its ability to detect non-compliance. The DCI pointed out the role of the U.S. policy-maker in making judgments about non-compliance. D/ACIS described the on-site inspection procedures, including ones undertaken at short notice. The Senator was interested in Article 14 of the Treaty and wondered if this section created a legal impediment to U.S. efforts in helping to modernize NATO. [REDACTED]

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Senator Exon focused on possibilities for Soviet cheating on the Treaty, pointing out that it would be easier for Moscow since the USSR is a closed society. The Senator's questions went onward to issues of on-site inspection at which time it was pointed out that the Soviets would not likely permit inspection of suspect sites not specified in the Treaty and related documents, and the intrusive nature of the INF inspection regime. [REDACTED]

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Senator Bradley concentrated on costs for the Soviets to maintain a covert SS-20 force and Soviet motives for cheating. DIA, the NIO/SP and D/SOVA discussed Soviet motives, political risks and related factors. [REDACTED]

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Senator Quayle reviewed the cruise missile aspects of the INF Treaty which included comments from intelligence representatives on use of drones, hypervelocity vehicles, as well as difficulty in determining conventional/nuclear warheads and armed/non-armed missiles. [REDACTED]

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Senator Humphrey began by commending DIA for holding to its position on the SS-20 missile count while other intelligence organizations had lower numbers. The discussion went into the methodology used by different agencies to develop a missile count. The Senator then asked about Soviet dependence on other weapons for targets which would have been handled by SS-20's. In this discussion, the DCI stated that it was important that all scenarios be considered by the policy-maker in weighing the Treaty. The Senator also queried the intelligence officers on Soviet methods for destroying the SS-20's. [REDACTED]

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Senator Bradley focused on the methods for developing estimates of Soviet missiles and the NIO/SP explained the review of data on storage practices/capabilities, military exercises, training and missile production. A covert force and conclusions about degradation of missile capabilities from two to ten years were again discussed. The Senator also raised questions about encryption of telemetry and language of SALT II regarding this activity. [REDACTED]

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Gordon Negus summarized his prepared statement for the Committee, focusing on the reasons for different missile counts by different intelligence organizations and the considerations reviewed by DIA when developing cheating scenarios. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] of NSA provided a general description of how NSA collects intelligence on the Soviet missile program.

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The following issues were raised by Members of Congress during the hearing on 3 February. Responses and comments were provided by the DCI and other officers of the Intelligence Community.

Chairman Boren raised the subject of intelligence collection systems [REDACTED] and their effectiveness for monitoring arms control treaties. The Chairman was concerned that the Administration had not asked for increased resources for new or improved systems. Larry Gershwin and [REDACTED] responded to queries about time frames in which there would be satellite coverage and under what weather conditions. [REDACTED] offered to provide a summary of specific information concerning satellite coverage and revisit times. [REDACTED]

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Senator Cohen focused on testing of the SS-25, suggesting the missile as a follow-on to the SS-23 and not covered by the Treaty. The NIO/SP pointed out that the SS-25 could help cover SS-20 targets, while the SS-23 was associated with ground forces and was not related to the SS-20 military requirements. [REDACTED]

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Senator Nunn raised points under the Treaty which restrict missile testing. Tests on the SCUD, under the 300 kms, were to be allowed. The SCUD was regarded as a very inaccurate missile and there has been some evidence that a replacement was under development. [REDACTED]

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In Senator Glenn's view, the crux of the INF question was the level of confidence to which monitoring capabilities could ensure national security. The DCI explained that the Intelligence Community was confident that adequate information could be provided to policy-makers to make reasonable judgements about Soviet compliance. Mr. Negus stated that DIA had assured the JCS that intelligence monitoring was adequate for judging compliance under the INF. [REDACTED]

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Senator Cranston raised SS-20 problems and was told of difficulties in counting missiles and assessing non-deployed ones. [REDACTED]

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In closing the hearing, Chairman Boren stated that the record would be left open to handle additional information. The Chairman reiterated preliminary Committee judgments that there appeared to be a need to upgrade technical collection systems, particularly in consideration of upcoming START negotiations. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]  
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